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PREFERENCE BY RACE IN UNIVERSITY
ADMISSIONS AND THE QUEST FOR
DIVERSITY
CARL COHEN*
I. UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS AND RACE PREFERENCE
The President of the University of Michigan publicly admits that
in admissions at his university, "We do discriminate."' But he and
many others believe that the kind of racial discrimination embodied
in recent and current admission preference given to ethnic minorities
is justifiable, and that it is constitutionally defensible in the name of
diversity. I will argue in what follows that this is not correct.
At issue is race preference, not affirmative action. In its original
and proper sense, "affirmative action" denoted a variety of positive
steps aimed at the eradication of racial discrimination. The Civil
Rights Act of 1964,2 expressly authorizing courts to take affirmative
action to uproot ensconced discriminatory practices, was plainly
intended by its sponsors to prohibit (in most spheres of public life) all
* Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan.
1. Lee Bollinger, World News Tonight with Peter Jennings, ABC television broadcast,
Dec. 2, 1997. Professor Bollinger is a Constitutional scholar of distinction whose judgments
deserve thoughtful consideration. He is a colleague and friend of the author and also, in his
personal capacity, is one of the respondents in two law suits filed in October of 1997 in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan: Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter, v. Bollinger
et a. In both cases the admissions practices of the University of Michigan are at issue.
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
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racial discrimination, all preference by race.3 This prohibition applies
without a doubt to universities receiving federal financial assistance.
Section 603 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 reads in full: "No person
in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance."
5
This seems rather clear. Four of the justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court held, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,6 that
this federal statute had been so plainly violated by the racially
discriminatory admissions system of the medical school at the
University of California at Davis that it was not necessary to go
beyond Title VI to establish the impermissibility of that admissions
program. But race preferences in admissions at universities today are
as blatant as they were in 1978. This is proved beyond doubt by
documents prepared by some leading universities.
Racial classifications are "constitutionally suspect."8 A majority
3. See Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 221 (1979) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). In
Steelworkers, Justice Rehnquist cites at length the unambiguous statements made by the
sponsors of that legislation, during the debates upon the Civil Rights Act on the floor of the
House and of the Senate. See id. (citing 110 CONG. REC. 1511-14,511 (1964)).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
5. li
6. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
7. Here, and in what follows below, I refer in part to documents that I have obtained on
several occasions since 1996 from the University of Michigan under the Michigan Freedom of
Information Act. Among these documents are the following: (1) "Guidelines for All Terms of
1996," College of Literature, Science and the Arts, Office of Undergraduate Admissions; (2)
"Profile of the University of Michigan: Group-Underrepresented Minorities"; (3) Profile of
the University of Michigan: All Units Total"; (4) "Admissions Grid of LSAT & GPA for
Caucasian Americans" (1995) The University of Michigan Law School Admissions Office; (5)
Admissions Grid of LSAT & GPA for African Americans (1995), the University of Michigan
Law School Admissions Office; (6) "Screen Groups for Applicants," University of Michigan
Medical School Admissions Office (1996); (7) "Matriculant Information (Standard Pool Only)"
University of Michigan Medical School.
The intent to discriminate by race could hardly be hidden in the University of California
admissions system struck down in Bakke; but that intent had to be (and was) inferred from the
structure and the results of the admissions system there. Admissions systems today say, in plain
English (intended for internal use only) how they intend to discriminate by race. No inferences
are needed. University documents make formally explicit the different standards that are
applied to applicants depending only upon the color of their skin.
8. See Personnel Administration of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,272 (1979) ("A racial
classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld
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of the Supreme Court has held unambiguously that, as Justice
O'Connor put it in Croson, "the standard of review under the Equal
Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or
benefited by a particular classification," and the single standard for
the review of all racial classifications is "strict scrutiny"9: no racial
classification by the state is permissible unless it is essential for the
service of a state interest that is compelling, and unless it can be
shown that that racial classification is narrowly tailored to address the
compelling state objective in view. 10 All this is settled law.
Two grounds for the use of race preference in university
admission that are commonly put forward may be firmly dismissed in
the light of this standard. Both of these were addressed explicitly by
Justice Powell in Bakke, and both were rejected categorically.'
Before turning to my central purpose, I review these two arguments
and their failings briefly, so that we may be clear about what cannot
justify race preference in university admissions.
First. The University of California had argued in Bakke that the
number of blacks and Hispanics in some professional spheres is
simply too low. Preferential admissions for minorities are justified,
the University argued, in order to "reduc[e] the historic deficit of
traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools and in the
medical profession."12 That same argument is heard repeatedly today:
more blacks and Hispanic students are sorely needed, and to achieve
that greater representation of minorities in the student body,
preference given to them in admissions is justified.
This argument in defense of race preference was rejected flatly by
Justice Powell, who dismissed it with one crisp paragraph:
If petitioner's purpose is to assure within its student body some
specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its
race or ethnic origin, such a preferential purpose must be
rejected not as insubstantial but as facially invalid. Preferring
only upon an extraordinary justification.").
9. See Richmond v. J.A. Crson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493-94 (1989).
10. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097,2112-13 (1995).
11. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,307 (1978).
12. Brief for the Univ. of Cal., at 32, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978).
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members of any one group for no reason other than race or
ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake. This the
Constitution forbids.13
Using racial devices to undo historical imbalance is
unconstitutional on its face. Not only is racial balance not a
compelling objective; it may not even be a lawful one. Racial balance
cannot possibly serve as the compelling interest that may satisfy the
standard of strict scrutiny. No justification for admission preference
is to be found here.
Second. The University of California explained that its
preferential admissions were intended to counter the effects of
"societal discrimination."' 14 Damage earlier done to blacks and
Hispanics by society, the University argued, justifies admissions
preference given as compensation to members of those ethnic groups.
This defense of preference was also rejected categorically in
Bakke.'s The Bakke Court stated that any agency of government
aiming to give compensatory relief may do so only after there has
been a reliable identification of the persons injured and the nature of
the injuries they suffered.' 6 Any systematic preference in admissions
would therefore certainly require that there had been 'judicial,
legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory
violations."'17 Only then, with the kind and extent of the injury
known, might the preference be conceivably defensible as remedy.
But the University of California then, like every other university now,
"[did] not purport to have made, and [was] in no position to make,
such findings."' 8 The Bakke Court stated that the University of
California's "broad mission is education, not the formulation of any
legislative policy or the adjudication of particular claims of illegality.
... [I]solated segments of our vast governmental structures are not
competent to make those decisions."' 9 Moreover, a university does
13. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
14. Id. at 306.
15. Seeid. at307-10.
16. See, e.g., Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial
Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298,330 (1998).
17. Bakke, 438 U.S. at309.
18. Id.
19. Id. (emphasis added).
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not and cannot have "the authority and capability to establish, in the
record, that the [racial] classification used is responsive to identified
discrimination." 20 Therefore a university, however noble its
intentions, certainly may not impose burdens upon some, and give
advantages to others, using racial devices. Powell is very emphatic on
this point: "To hold otherwise would be to convert a remedy
heretofore reserved for violations of legal rights into a privilege that
all institutions throughout the Nation could grant at their pleasure to
whatever groups are perceived as victims of social discrimination."
21
The incompetence of any university to award what it may claim to
be compensatory relief deserves emphasis, in view of the great
frequency with which such compensatory justifications are put
forward today. The phrase "remedy for societal discrimination"
would fly in the face of Bakke and is of course avoided. But very
often we are told that race preference in admissions is a way of
"creating a level playing field," or "making up for the handicap
suffered by a long-shackled runner in a great race," 2 and so on. Such
metaphors are introduced to defend race preferences as compensation
for societal injury-compensatory devices not within the authority of
universities to employ.
Wrongs deserve redress, of course; their remedy may be a demand
of justice. But it is arrogant of university administrators to suppose
that they and their admissions officers, often operating in secret,
23
have the wisdom and the competence to decide which racial groups
will be favored and which disfavored, by how much, and how
individuals will be classified by group-to satisfy their vision of how
the playing field is to be properly "leveled."
The justification of university preferences as compensatory is
doomed to fail where scrutiny is strict; such reasoning could
conceivably apply only in settings in which the injury for which
redress is being given had been inflicted by the institution giving that
redress, because only then would it be possible to tailor such a
20. Id.at3lO.
21. Id.
22. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 134 (Harper & Row 1964).
23. Documents in which university preferential admissions programs are detailed are
commonly hidden, and as at the University of Michigan "CONFIDENTIAL: INTERNAL USE
ONLY."
19981
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remedy to the wrong. State universities today, even when they parade
the ugliest chapters of their ancient history in self-abnegation, cannot
show that the race preferences they give do compensate, or can
compensate, persons who have earlier suffered racial wrongs. 24
Just as "racial balance" fails to justify university admissions
preference, "compensation" also fails. What remains that might
succeed? Diversity.
II. THE RESORT TO DIVERSITY
As most commonly used in universities today, "diversity" is
simply a euphemism for the impermissible goal of racial balance, a
mix of ethnic proportions more closely approximating those
proportions in the population at large. In spite of its constitutional
failings, noted earlier, this remains an appealing and "correct"
objective in academic politics: student bodies (it is commonly said)
must become more "representative," must more nearly "reflect" the
population of the state, must more truly "look like America." The
plausibility of ethnic proportionality as a standard of justice is rooted
in the tacit premise that, had there been no racial oppression, all
attainments and skills would be homogeneously distributed among all
persons and groups, with no patterns or clusters. That premise is
certainly false, of course. But here I simply note that when university
officers assert that they give preferences to make their institutions
more "diverse," they generally mean nothing more than that they are
in pursuit of racial balance. In this sense, as we have seen, "diversity"
cannot serve as a justification, moral or legal, for the race preferences
commonly awarded.
But "diversity" can mean something quite different from racial
balance in an educational context. The point made by Justice Powell
24. The University of Texas tried to rescue the compensatory justification by arguing in
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996), that the
race preferences in admission at their law school were designed to compensate for racial
damage done by Texas public schools. But the preferences were given, as the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals pointed out, to minority applicants who had never attended Texas schools, to
some who never lived in Texas, and even to applicants who had never lived in the United
States. The compensatory justification of race preference in admission was there, as it most
often is, a story not worthy of belief.
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in 1978 (and echoed repeatedly since) is that where obtaining truth is
the aim, a "'wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which
discovers truth out of a multitude of tongues'' 25 is very useful.
Responding to this interest (a constitutional interest because it is
associated with the First Amendment protection of free speech),
Justice Powell offers diversity as a consideration that may justify
taking race into account in some admissions decisions.
It cannot be emphasized too strongly that what might, in this view,
sometimes justify taking race into account, is intellectual diversity-
variety of judgment and attitude. Only in that sense might "diversity"
serve as a First Amendment consideration, clearly. Therefore, when
anyone (including Justice Powell) takes skin color or race to be a
feature of an applicant that can serve to enhance diversity, he makes
the assumption that judgments and attitudes are linked to race, that
persons of a given race may be expected to approach intellectual
issues with certain known convictions or with certain states of mind,
while other standpoints and states of mind may be expected in those
of other colors. This is a dangerous and deeply troubling supposition.
The slippage from the quest for intellectual diversity to the quest for
racial diversity relies tacitly but essentially on racial stereotypes,
some of which are outrageous. We rightly ridicule them as ignorant
and unfair, and we have long sought to uproot them. But many
stereotypes remain embedded and fester, and they are the links upon
which the "diversity" justification of race preference depends.
Enhancing intellectual diversity among students is not truly the
reason universities give race preference in admission. If it were, we
would witness far more strenuous efforts to achieve such diversity
through the use of screens that might increase intellectual variety
much more directly and surely than does race. Conservatives would
be sought in a liberal context, liberals where conservatives
predominate; creationists and communists, elitists and civil
libertarians, ascetics and atheists and religious fundamentalists, and
so on-all would be sought out. Student recruiting would go on in
ways fashioned to catch at least some fish from these and other
intellectual ponds. This is very rarely done. Moreover, the racial
25. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362,
372 (1943)).
1998l
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preferences now given actually undermine any genuine quest for
intellectual diversity. On most controversial matters, preferred
minority applicants exhibit political and moral views essentially
identical to those of the majority of white students. The supposition
that race preference in admission would yield diversity of view turns
out to be thoroughly mistaken; with respect to intellectual standpoints
adopted, current preferences almost invariably serve the interests of
conformity. Powell's "First Amendment" concerns do not begin to
support the uses of race in admissions.
In any event, it is not intellectual diversity but intellectually
promising students whom the universities mainly prize in the real
world; truly able students are wanted whatever their points of view.
The truth is that universities do not really much care what convictions
students happen to hold, so long as they are smart.
In not much caring, they may be wise, as there is very little
beyond anecdotal evidence to support the claim that a variety of
viewpoints among students does, in fact, have any significant impact
upon the quality of the learning that goes on. When Justice Powell
referred to "the robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of
a multitude of tongues," he was quoting an earlier case in which the
focus was on the reporting of the news.26 In that context, of course, it
is important to promote the availability of reports formulated by
persons with different perspectives and biases, rather than to provide
one news report (as Powell's citation continues) "through any kind of
authoritative selection."
27
But this does little to support the truth of hyperbolic claims
regarding the allegedly overwhelming importance of "diversity." And
the inattention of university officers to genuinely intellectual
diversity casts serious doubt on the plausibility of such propositions
as "Without diversity there can be no excellence!" to which lip
service is now commonly given in academic circles.28 Very few
26. See id. (quoting Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. at 372).
27. Id (quoting Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. at 372).
28. Typical is the remark of L. Lee Knefelkamp, a King, Chavez, Parks visiting Professor
at the University of Michigan, made during a public lecture in Ann Arbor on February 9, 1998:
"[W]e cannot have excellent universities if they do not mirror the diversity in our society." 53
U. MICH. RECORD 7 (Feb. 18, 1998).
In this arena hyperbole knows almost no limit. The Vice-Chancellor for Student Affairs
[Vol. 54:43
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seriously believe such a claim to be true-and indeed it is not true.
The great English and German universities of generations past rose to
intellectual excellence with student bodies that were remarkably
lacking in diversity; in our own Ivy League colleges, intellectual
achievement seems not to have been greatly hindered by the absence
of great diversity.
29
But intellectual diversity has been held, in Bakke, to be weighty
enough that (on the implicit supposition that points of view are
regularly linked to skin color) race may be a factor in some
admissions. 30 This defense of intellectual diversity as a support for
state-imposed racial classifications was shared by no other member
of the Court in Bakke and by no justice of the U.S. Supreme Court
from that time to this. Justice Powell is lonely in relying upon it. But
he did rely upon it. And as a consequence of the configuration of that
Court on the key questions raised in Bakke, Justice Powell's opinion
was and is controlling.3' If the principles expressed by the Fifth
and Special Programs for the entire State University of New York system expresses the
conventional wisdom more simply: "[D]iversity is excellence." 11 ACADEMIC QUESTIONS 52
(Winter 1998).
29. The President of California State University at Northridge, Ms. Blenda Wilson, was
questioned in October of 1996 by the Chairman of the Education Finance Subcommittee of the
California State Assembly, and by Special Counsel Robert Corry. Part of the exchange went as
follows:
Mr. Corry: Do you believe that ethnic diversity ... is essential to quality in higher
education?
Ms. Wilson: Yes, I do.
Mr. Corry: Do you have any evidence or studies or scholarly works that bolster that
opinion?
Ms. Wilson: No, I don't. I would acknowledge... that higher education has failed in
the scholarly sense to establish the principle... [W]e haven't justified the assumption
that diversity is important in scientific ways. We haven't done the kinds of analysis
and research studies ... to demonstrate the validity of the principle.
The Use of Race, Gender, and Ethnic Considerations at Institutions of Higher Education,
Education Finance Subcommittee, California State Assembly (1997).
30. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311-15.
31. Briefly: Four justices (led by Justice Stevens) held that Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act completely resolves the matter in Bakke's favor;, they would strike down the University's
racially preferential program and order Bakke admitted. Stevens is very sharp:
[T]he meaning of the Title VI ban on exclusion is crystal clear:. Race cannot be the
basis of excluding anyone from participation in a federally funded program.
In short, nothing in the legislative history justifies the conclusion that the broad
language of 601 should not be given its natural meaning. We are dealing with a
1998]
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Circuit Court of Appeals in Hopwood v. Texas32 come to prevail, as
one day they may, the entire diversity defense will become a nullity.
But it is only in the Fifth Circuit that Hopwood governs now;
elsewhere it is the rules laid down by Justice Powell that must be
obeyed. So we are obliged to ask: under the principles laid down in
Bakke, can the quest for diversity justify the racial preferences now
widely given by our universities?
III. ARE THE PRINCIPLES OF THE BAKKE DECISION INTERNALLY
INCONSISTENT?
The price of inconsistency is this: from any two contradictory
propositions taken as premises, any proposition whatever may be
validly inferred.33 Some contend that the contradictions within
distinct statutory prohibition, enacted at a particular time with particular concerns in
mind; neither its language nor any prior interpretation suggests that its place in the
Civil Rights Act, won after long debate, is simply that of a constitutional appendage.
In unmistakable terms the Act prohibits the exclusion of individuals from federally
funded programs because of their race. As succinctly phrased during the Senate
debate, under Title VI it is "not permissible to say 'yes' to one person; but to say 'no'
to another person, only because of the color of his skin."
Md. at 418.
Four other justices (led by Justice Brennan) held that because Title VI was intended to
implement the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it could mean no more
than that Clause does. The plurality further held that because the Equal Protection Clause was
designed to support the advancement of blacks, and the programs in question were designed
with the same purpose, the Equal Protection Clause does not proscribe them, and, consequently,
Title VI does not proscribe them either.
Justice Powell held the deciding vote. He held, with Brennan, that a constitutional
investigation here was unavoidable: the issue posed by race preference in admission is whether
such preference does deny to those disfavored by such preference the equal protection of the
laws. But Powell also held with Stevens that the University of California admissions
preferences must be struck down, and that Bakke must be admitted to the university, because
the answer to the constitutional question was very clear preference given by race does most
certainly deny the equal protection of the laws. The posture of each of the three positions left
Powell's opinion in control; it was through his opinion that the judgment of the Court was
announced. And because, in that very famous opinion, the recourse to diversity is given some
legitimacy, that reference in Powell's opinion has been the refuge of university admissions
offices from that day to this.
32. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
33. The explanation (far from universally understood) is this: Suppose one asserts both
that (1) P is true, and that (2) P is false. From the fact that P is true one may infer, validly, that
(3) either P is true or the moon is made of green cheese. From that proposition, plus the falsity
of P, one may validly infer that the moon is made of green cheese. In sum: from two
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Powell's opinion explain how it happens that all sides find support in
his language. This criticism of Powell is not sound. His Bakke
opinion is complicated, and it is in some ways confusing; but it is not
confused and it is not internally inconsistent.
What puzzles many is this: Powell rejects race preference
emphatically. He finds it a violation of the Constitution if color be
used as a criterion by which people are treated differently. That is
exactly what the admissions program at the University of California
did: it classified applicants by race and responded to applicants of
different races differently. Under our Constitution, Powell holds,
using race in that way is totally unacceptable, a manifest violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ["No
state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."] Eloquently, Powell writes: "The guarantee
of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one
individual and something else when applied to a person of another
color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not
equal."
34
So far, clear enough. But then, later in the opinion, Powell
explains that race may indeed be taken into account on some
occasions in evaluating some applicants. Now if race may be taken
into account in weighing an application, are we not treating people
differently simply because of their color? Is it then not the case that
Powell's passages in which the use of race is condoned contradict the
passages in which classification by race is condemned?
No, that is not the case. In understanding why Powell's principles
are consistent we will also better understand the narrow limits within
which (in his view) race may be taken into account, and why the
admissions preferences now commonly awarded go very far beyond
those limits.
Consider first the context in which Powell sought to make room
for some consideration of race. Allan Bakke's case had reached the
contradictory propositions: (1) that race may never be considered in university admissions, and
(2) that race may sometimes be considered in admissions, it may be validly inferred that the
moon is made of purple cheese--or Gorgonzola, if you like. For a detailed explanation of the
consequences of self-contradiction, see I.M. COPI & C. COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 420-
23 (Prentice-Hall 10th ed. 1998).
34. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90.
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California Supreme Court on cross appeals. The Superior Court of
California had held that the University of California's admissions
program was clearly not constitutional; it ordered that the University
was henceforth prohibited from taking race into account in any way
in making admissions decisions. The University appealed, of course.
But Bakke also was unsatisfied because he had not won from the trial
court what Marco DeFunis, in Washington four years before, had
obtained: the order that he be admitted.35 So Bakke appealed.
The Supreme Court of California (one of the most liberal in the
nation at the time) gave Bakke the order of admission that he
sought,36 and it gave him also a resounding victory on matters of
principle, affirming those portions of the trial court's judgment
declaring the special admissions program unlawful and holding that
the University would be henceforth enjoined from considering the
race of any applicant. No consideration of race by the University, of
any kind, was permissible under the Constitution.
35. See Definis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). Ironically, it was because DeFunis had
been admitted to the University of Washington School of Law at the order of the lowest court
that his case was ultimately held moot by the U.S. Supreme Court. For on appeal to the
Washington Supreme Court, DeFunis's victory on matters of principle was reversed, but he was
allowed to remain in law school as the case continued up the appellate hierarchy. By the time
his appeal had reached the U.S. Supreme Court, DeFunis was well into his third year in law
school, and the University of Washington conceded at oral argument that because he was
advancing very satisfactorily toward his degree, even if the University were to prevail, DeFunis
would not be ejected. Whereupon the Supreme Court-over the vehement dissent of Justice
William 0. Douglas-held the matter moot, but invited other cases of similar sort. Bakke's was
the first of these to arrive.
In Defunis, Justice Douglas evidenced his plain disgust with the emphasis given to the skin
color of lawyers by the University of Washington. He wrote:
The equal protection clause commands the elimination of racial barriers, not their
creation in order to satisfy our theory of how society ought to be organized. The
purpose of the University of Washington cannot be to produce Black lawyers for
Blacks, Polish lawyers for Poles, Jewish lawyers for Jews, Irish lawyers for the Irish. It
should be to produce good lawyers for Americans.
Id. at 342.
36. The trial court had held that, although the admissions program was clearly
unconstitutional, it could not now be determined whether, absent its racial preferences, Bakke
would indeed have been admitted. But in the California Supreme Court he won the order of
admission on the ground that, fault by the University having been shown, it must either admit
him or sustain the burden of showing that he would not have been admitted in the absence of
those wrongful preferences. The burden of proof shifted, and that burden the University
admitted it could not sustain.
[Vol. 54:43
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol54/iss1/6
PREFERENCE BY RACE
This categorical exclusion, much like that adopted by the Fifth
Circuit in Hopwood, was what confronted the Supreme Court in
1978. Powell thought it too rigid, too preclusive. He had been
President of the American Bar Association, and was well acquainted
with worldly complexities. The intellectual aims of the premier
universities he understood, and he sympathized with their efforts to
select appropriate entering classes from among the very many who
applied for admission. Powell's was a balanced mind. His response to
the rigid exclusion of the California Supreme Court was nuanced.
Said he, in effect: Classification by race is wrong, to be sure. The
Constitution forbids it. We begin there. Must we therefore insist that
there be no consideration of race under any circumstances whatever?
No, that extreme response is not called for. There will be times when
a university, doing the very best job it can in selecting an entering
class, and seeking the diversity that helps to make it a rich and
exciting environment, may, in weighing applicant A against applicant
B, want to reason roughly as follows:
Candidate A exhibits this virtue and that, while Candidate B
exhibits that virtue and the other; the two are very close,
academically and in other ways. But B, reared in upper middle
class suburbia, is very similar in background to many others
already accepted, while A is from the inner city and is black.
For the sake of diversity let's go with A.
That, Powell thought, would not be an impermissible
consideration of race. It meets the Constitutional standard, he
believed, because when weighed in this fashion, race would have
entered the picture only in considering the application of an
individual applicant, all of whose merits and demerits had been
weighed. This is the nub of the matter. If race is ever to be taken into
account it must be only in certain very limited ways, ways very
clearly specified in the judgment of the Court. First, it must, if
considered at all, be considered only as part of the genuine quest for
intellectual diversity. And by intellectual diversity, Powell says in no
uncertain terms, "I mean just that." If a university uses race in ways
that are merely aimed to achieve ethnic diversity, they fail; that
1998]
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would misconceive what is involved in seeking diversity.37 We mean
genuine diversity, real variety of viewpoint on as many dimensions as
can be explored-hence, the need to weigh many factors, not
ethnicity alone.
Second, if ever race be taken into account (and it is certainly not
the obligation of any university to take it into account), it must serve
as no more than one of those many factors enriching the pool-as a
"plus factor" at most, in the response given to the file of a '!particular
applicant. "38 This particularization is absolutely critical because, if
the consideration of race be always particularized, no one will be
treated unfairly by its consideration, or denied equal protection. Each
applicant so considered will have benefited from the weighing of all
of the factors that may advance his or her application. One applicant
may get plus consideration for musical talent that others lack, another
for laboratory experience, a third for a contribution to ethnic diversity
in the entering class, and so on. Some applicants must lose out in the
end, of course. And some successful applicants may then have
benefited from the fact that they are of this or that ethnicity. But
every applicant will, individually, have been treated with attention to
the merits of his or her entire file, competing against all the other
applicants treated in like fashion. Such a system involves no
discrimination by race. That was Powell's vision.
This vision excludes all classification by race as a systematic
device for sorting applicants. Automatic or routine advantages given
to black applicants, or to applicants of any ethnic group would, in
37. Here follows the critical passage:
The argument [of the University of California that racial classification by itself serves
the interest of diversity) is seriously flawed. In a most fundamental sense the argument
misconceives the nature of the state interest that would justify consideration of race or
ethnic background. It is not an interest in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified
percentage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to be members of selected ethnic
groups, with the remaining percentage an undifferentiated aggregation of students. The
diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of
qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though
important element ... [The University of California's] special admissions program,
focused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than further attainment of
genuine diversity.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315 (emphasis added).
38. Id. at317 (emphasis added).
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Powell's view, be the very negation of individualized appraisal. The
University of California system was, as many university systems now
are, pervaded by precisely such systematic classification. That was,
and remains, morally intolerable and Constitutionally impermissible.
In Powell's view, therefore, no admissions system may be allowed
to employ deliberate discrimination by ethnic category. Under no
circumstances may it be a "means of according racial preference."
39
Advocates of preference commonly contend that what was ruled out
in the Bakke decision was no more than "rigid quotas," while the use
of less rigid "goals" was there approved. This is not so. Powell is
explicit: "This semantic distinction [between quotas and goals, as
applied to the University of California system] is beside the point:
The special admissions program is undeniably a classification based
on race and ethnic background.' 40
There follows immediately a passage that highlights the
fundamental failing of every generalized preference by race. Whether
described as a "quota" or a "goal," Powell observes, such preference
exhibits this feature: "it is a line drawn on the basis of race and
ethnic status.'4 1 But that is unacceptable, he continues, because "[i]t
is settled beyond question that the rights created by the first section of
the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the
individual. The rights established are personal rights.' 4 2 Any system
that draws such lines, that relies upon such classifications, that treats
applicants differently on the basis of their color, manifestly violates
the Equal Protection Clause of our Constitution.
The consistency of Powell's principles (however wise or unwise
one may think them) may now be seen. Race taken into account in
some cases for some individual applicants, as one of the "plus
factors" supporting that individual's application, when weighed just
as other factors are weighed for other individual applicants-musical
talent for B, bi-lingual skills for C, etc.-leaves all applicants treated
in essentially the same way. A given factor may be weighed in the
39. Idat3I8.
40. Id. at 317 (emphasis added).
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. Id. (emphasis added). The language referred to is the Equal Protection Clause: "No
State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § I (emphasis added).
1998]
Washington University Open Scholarship
58 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW
case of one individual that we do not weigh in the case of another.
Considered occasionally, for some persons, race is not elevated to
special status; no systematic racial discrimination is invoked. But if
applicants are classified by race, all applicants of one race treated in
one way, all applicants of another race treated another way,
advantage or burden is attached to ethnic category and that is, indeed,
impermissible discrimination.43 When applicants are sorted by skin
colors, in a system in which there are institutional "goals" (even if
not rigid) for the ideal percentage of this or that skin color, the
admissions system is built on a system of racial classification that is
"odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the
doctrine of equality."" That is systematic discrimination by race.
Powell thought these two ways of taking race into account to be
profoundly different. They may seem similar if we are inattentive,
and some will treat them as identical for political purposes, but in
spirit and in essence they are contrasting. He writes:
It has been suggested that an admissions program which
considers race as only one factor is simply a subtle and more
sophisticated-but no less effective-means of according
racial preference.... [However, a] facial intent to discriminate
is evident in petitioner's [University of California's]
preference program and is not denied .... No such facial
infirmity exists in an admission program where race or ethnic
background is simply one element-to be weighed fairly
against other elements-in the selection process. "A boundary
line [he quotes Justice Frankfurter] is none the worse for being
narrow.
' 5
43. For the year 1998, the University of Michigan has devised a scheme in which points
are added to the scores of applicants for various reasons, yielding what is now called the
"Selection Index." In a system in which I point is given for an applicant's outstanding essay, 1
point is given for an applicant's exhibition of state-wide leadership and service, and an
applicant with an SAT score of 1600 receives 6 points more than an applicant with an SAT
scores of 930, every applicant with "Underrepresented Racial/Ethnic Minority Identification"
gets 20 additional points. This very substantial preference for certain skin colors is automatic,
not individualized, and, of course, it is often dispositive. See The University of Michigan,
Office of Undergraduate Admissions, Selection Index Worksheet (1998).
44. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)).
45. Id. at 318 (quoting McLeod v. Dilworth, 322 U.S. 327,329 (1944)).
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Powell was no simpleton. He realized well enough that the
individualized way of taking race into account for which he was
making some room might be abused by unscrupulous administrators,
transformed into systematic preference. Being an honorable man, he
began with the presumption that others would act honorably as well.
University admissions officers, clearly shown the ways in which they
may and may not take race into account, would not deliberately
cheat, would they? Toward the very end of his lengthy opinion
Powell writes: "And a court would not assume that a university,
professing to employ a facially nondiscriminatory admissions policy,
would operate it as a cover for the functional equivalent of a quota
system. In short, good faith would be presumed.... A,
6
But good faith has not been the piimary concern of those
confronting what they take to be a pressing political need to pursue
ethnic balance.
IV. APPLYING PRINCIPLES TO FACTS
The central question of whether the quest for diversity can justify
the race preferences in admission widely given by universities today
may now be answered without reservation. No, certainly not. If
"diversity" is no more than a code word for racial proportionality, its
insufficiency has long been settled. And if "diversity" is taken to
mean the intellectual diversity sought through the individualized
appraisal of applications, the preferential systems now commonly
employed fly directly in the face of the principles laid down in Bakke.
They do so because they invariably use race as a generalized sorting
device, a screen for the classification of applicants. Based directly on
such sorting systems, different actions are taken with respect to
persons alike in all known respects save their race. It is simply false
to say that current admission preferences treat race merely as a plus
factor in the weighing of individual applicants.
Proof of this is most readily given by exhibiting an actual
preferential system recently in use. I refer in what follows to The
University of Michigan as exemplar, not because it is alone in using
systematic racial classifications, but because it is a very prominent
46. Id. at 318-19.
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user of them, and because it happens that documents obtained from
the admissions offices of that University, using the Freedom of
Information Act, are in my possession.47
A. Example 1: Classifying by Race on First Review
A large university of good repute receives tens of thousands of
applications for admission to its undergraduate colleges; at the
University of Michigan the yearly applicant pool exceeds 20,000.
There must obviously be some preliminary sorting to identify those
who cannot qualify for admission, but must not be left without early
response. This "First Review" has long been done by creating a grid,
with 90 cells, based upon known academic performance. Applicants'
grade point averages (GPA, on a four-point scale) in secondary
schools appear on the vertical axis: top row 4.0; second row 3.99-
3.80; third row 3.79-3.60; and so on, down to 2.0. Applicants' test
scores (SAT or ACT) appear on the horizontal axis: the column at
furthest right headed 1500-1600 (SAT), 34-36 (ACT); the column at
furthest left headed 400-840 (SAT), 0-17 (ACT).
Each applicant's file falls into one of the resultant cells.
Admissions counselors are given precise instructions regarding the
letters of response to be sent to the applicants in each cell. These
responses are coded; apart from the codes beginning with D
(indicating delay, for cases in which critical information is missing
from the file, or for other reasons), there are two large families of
response: those beginning with A (directing a letter of admission of
some kind) and those beginning with R (directing a letter of rejection
of some kind).
In each cell, therefore, one would expect (apart from delays) a
unique instruction for response: reject (with possible qualification),
admit (with possible qualification), or delay for good reason.49 On the
grid prepared by the University, however, each cell contains two rows
47. For the specific identification of some of these documents, see supra note 7.
48. The University of Michigan, College of Literature, Science and the Arts, Guidelines
for All Terms of 1996" Office of Undergraduate Admissions, at 2 (1996). The author obtained
this document in response to a request made under the Michigan Freedom of Information Act.
49. The many possible qualifications contribute to the complexity of the process and the
need for coded instructions.
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of instructions (and in a few cells, three rows). The top row in many
cells is coded R, for rejection, while the middle and bottom rows are
coded A, for admission. How can this make sense? How could
counselors respond consistently to this apparently contradictory set of
instructions?
The answer is to be found in the overriding instruction, in bold
face type, that appears at the top of the grid: "In General, [sic] use the
top row in each cell for majority applicants and the middle and
bottom rows for underrepresented minorities and other disadvantaged
students. 50 In cell after cell, in which have been placed the
applications of hundreds or thousands of applications for first review,
applicants with the very same credentials, so far as those credentials
are then known, are treated differently by race: majority applicants
are commonly rejected while minority applicants (defined in this
document as "American Indians, Black/African-American, and
Hispanic/Latino Americans" 51) in that same cell are admitted. 52
Nothing could be clearer than that, in the University's admissions
system using this grid for first review, there are "line[s] drawn on the
basis of race and ethnic status. 53 Systematic racial classification is
the ground of decisions made, preference is being accorded,
applicants are routinely given different treatment, for no reason other
than the color of their skin. The critical questions may be answered
by each reader for himself: Is race preference of this kind what
Justice Powell, in Bakke, had sought to accommodate? Or is this
system, when used by an agency of the State, a denial of the equal
protection of the laws?
50. Guidelines for All Terms of 1996, supra note 48, at 2.
51. Id. at 12.
52. University spokespersons defend their practices by saying that race is taken into
account late in the appraisal process, as a "plus factor." That is probably true; but it is also
plainly true that race is taken heavily into account very early in the appraisal process, as very
much more than a marginal plus factor. The grid here described is headed "First Review
Decisions." Majority applicants routinely rejected-many, as the instructions to the right of the
grid prescribe, "automatically by clerks"-will certainly never have their race reconsidered as a
plus factor.
53. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289.
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B. Example 2: Differential Cut-off Scores by Race
Admission to some demanding academic programs is very highly
prized. The Integrated Premedical-Medical Program (INTEFLEX) at
the University of Michigan is one of these. Admitted as freshmen,
students in this program begin medical studies in their sophomore
year and graduate after six years with both B.A. and M.D. degrees.
There are very few slots for very many applicants: competition for
entry is fierce. The requirements are stiff even to be considered for
the program: to enter the pool, applicants must have SAT scores of
1320+ (or ACT score of 30+) and a GPA of 3.6 (3.8 if the applicant
is not a Michigan resident).
Those are the cut-off scores which, if not equaled or exceeded,
result in routine rejection-but they apply to "Non-Minorities' 54 and
not to everyone. The cut-off scores are very different if the race is
different. For "ALL [sic] Underrepresented Minority Students" the
test scores required are: SAT 1170+ (or ACT 26+), and the GPA
required is 3.4 (for both residents and non-residents of Michigan).55
Between the SAT scores of 1320 and 1170 there is a very substantial
difference; between the GPAs of 3.8 and 3.4 there is an enormous
difference. Is this the consideration of race as a "plus factor" for
individual applicants? Or is it systematic preference by race?
C. Example 3: Differential Admission Rates by Race
Documents prepared by the University of Michigan thus provide
indisputable evidence of the "facial intent" to discriminate by race,
the clearly formulated plan upon which applicants are to be treated
differently on the basis of their skin color. But other documents,
reporting the admission rates for minorities and for non-minorities in
the several colleges of the University, show that the results of such
discriminatory policies are very marked. Grids are often prepared,
showing the number in any intellectual category who applied, and the
number in that category who were accepted.
Item: One such grid from the University of Michigan reveals that,
54. See Guidelinesfor All Terms of 1996, supra note 42, at 9.
55. Seeid.at9-10.
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for students with good (but not outstanding) test scores and mediocre
high school records, admission is difficult-if the applicant is white.
In three such middling cells, of 478 "non-minority" applicants 56
were admitted-an admission rate of under 12%. For Hispanic,
Indian, and African-American applicants with identical intellectual
credentials the story is very different. In those same three cells the
number of "underrepresented minority" applicants was 48 and the
number admitted was 48-100%.56
Item: The University of Michigan School of Law (where
admission is highly competitive) produced a grid showing several
cells in which the number of "Caucasian American" applicants is
great, the number of admissions offered is very small: in one cell
there were 51 applicants but only 1 admission; in another cell 61
applicants but only 1 admission; in a third cell 126 applicants but
only 5 admissions. The admission rate for "Caucasian Americans" in
these categories is under 3%.57 But in the very same cells on the
identical matrix prepared (also by the School of Law) for "African
Americans" the ratios are sharply different. In the first of the three
cells noted above, 10 applicants and 10 admissions; in the second, 3
applicants and 3 admissions, in the third, 4 applicants and 4
admissions-an admission rate of 100%.58 The applicants reported on
the two sheets differ (so far as these calculations apply) only in their
race.
The examples given here are only few of a great many. Systematic
race preferences such as these-typical of the preferential practices of
universities around the country-cannot be justified under the
principles laid down in Bakke.
56. See University of Michigan, Office of Undergraduate Admissions, Profile of the
University of Michigan; Underrepresented Minorities and Total Units (1994). Requests for the
updated version of these grids are met with the response that the Office of Undergraduate
Admissions no longer prepares such records.
57. The University of Michigan Law School Admissions Office, Admissions Grid ofLSA T
& GPA for Caucasian Americans (Dec. 7, 1995). The author's request for the analogous
document for the academic year 1996-1997 was met by the response that this record is no
longer prepared by the Law School.
58. The University of Michigan Law School Admissions Office, Admissions Grid ofLSAT
& GPA for African Americans (Dec. 7, 1995). The author's request for the analogous document
for the academic year 1996-1997 was met by the response that this record is no longer prepared
by the Law School.
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V. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
A series of objections commonly made to the arguments above
deserve consideration. One objection no longer much heard is the
denial that race preferences are given.59 Such denials are no longer
believable or believed. Forced now to admit that they do take race
into account, university spokespersons argue that they do so for very
good reasons and in ways permitted by law. I address each common
objection in turn:
Objection 1:
We do take race into account, of course-but race for us is not
the only or the most important factor weighed. In Bakke the
Supreme Court said that race may be weighed as one among a
variety of factors. We do weigh race as one among a variety of
factors. Therefore "We are doing what the Supreme Court has
said we can do."
60
This argument is very bad. It is true that under Bakke race must be
one of many factors if its use is to be permitted. It is true that the
University weighs race as one of many factors; school grades, test
scores, place of residence, and so on, are also weighed, of course. But
it certainly does not follow that the present uses of race are in
compliance with the law.
The University's argument here is an egregious example of the
fallacy of affirming the consequent (P implies Q; Q is true; therefore
P is true).6 ' One could as well argue that because remaining in good
health requires that one eat a balanced diet, and because I do eat a
balanced diet, I must be in good health. A balanced diet may be a
59. The Director of the Office of Undergraduate Admissions at the University of
Michigan, whom we must suppose had a clear grasp of the preferences given by his office,
wrote in response to my inquiry, in a letter of 9 January 1997, as follows: "I can assure you that
the policies and practices of my office are fully in accord with the University of Michigan
policy of nondiscrimination by race or ethnicity." Letter from the Director of Undergraduate
Admissions at the University of Michigan to Carl Cohen (Jan. 9, 1997) (on file with author).
60. Rene Sanchez, Final Exam for Campus Affirmative Action? White Applicant's Test of
Michigan Admissions Could Set National Policy, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 1997, at Al (quoting
Lee Bollinger, President of the University of Michigan).
61. See COP & COHEN, supra note 34, at 376.
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necessary condition for good health, but it surely is not a sufficient
condition for good health.
Compliance with the principles laid down in Bakke indeed
requires that race, if taken into account, may be only one of many
factors weighed. But that is a necessary, not a sufficient condition of
compliance. It is also true that to meet constitutional standards, race,
if weighed at all, must be weighed only for individual applicants, as a
plus factor in some cases, in the same way that other factors may
provide a plus for other applicants individually considered.
Compliance requires that race not be the basis of a systematic
classification of applicants; compliance requires that generalized
racial preference not be accorded; compliance requires that the
system not be one within which "a line is drawn on the basis of race
or ethnic status." In sum, compliance requires that the system not be
one in which people are treated differently solely because of the
colors of their skin. It is manifest that the preferential systems now in
use, even if they satisfy the one condition that factors other than race
be also weighed, do not satisfy the several conditions that compliance
would entail.
Do university spokespersons reason so badly as seriously to
believe that a list of such factors (sometimes proudly distributed)
establishes their compliance with Bakke? Or do they think that the
public and the courts will be impressed by the list, and are so weak-
minded as not to attend to the difference between necessary and
sufficient conditions?
In an objection of similar sort, the President of the University of
Michigan argues that race is not "determinative" in admissions there;
no one is admitted because of race alone.62 He is entirely correct in
that; no applicant is accepted simply because she is black, or simply
because her scores are superlative, or for any single reason, of course.
But it does not follow that race is not dispositive for many applicants.
Other things being equal, race often makes all the difference. Skin
color is not the "sole" factor, true, and is not the "determinative"
factor, of course-it is just the factor that plays a systematically
crucial role. That is not consistent with our Constitution.
62. See Lee Bolinger, U. MICH. RECORD 3 (Oct. 15, 1997).
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Objection 2:
The admissions system at the University of California struck
down in Bakke was a two-track system: slots were reserved for
minorities, and minority applicants, being reviewed by a
separate committee, did not compete against all other
applicants. That was unfair. Today we use a one-track system;
all applicants are in a single pool reviewed by the same
committee. In short, ours is a permissible system because it is
unified.
Again, this argument exhibits the fallacy of affirming the
consequent. Much of the description given is technically correct. At
the University of Michigan, for example, there is but one pool, one
reviewing committee. All compete against all, and the system is, in
that sense, unified. These are necessary conditions for compliance-
but they are not sufficient to ensure that the constitutional guarantee
of equal protection has been satisfied.
For although all compete in a single pool, the standards on which
applicants compete within that pool are sharply different by race. We
have seen that there are, for example, different cut-off scores for
different racial groups, different responses to applicants on first
review on the basis of race, and so on. But it is also a necessary
condition of a constitutional system that applicants not be treated
differently simply because of the color of their skin. Within the
current "unified" systems, that condition is not satisfied.
Objection 3.
Under Bakke it is clear that in some cases race may be taken
into account, in the interest of diversity. But in view of the
very large number of applicants at many universities, there is
no feasible way to consider race with this end in view except
by doing so systematically. If we are not permitted to classify
our applicants by race, we will not be able to use race
effectively. Hence we are compelled, as a practical matter, to
introduce preferences of the kind currently employed.
This argument is worthless. Its tacit premise is that race must
somehow be used to achieve diversity along ethnic lines, and that if
the principles for its use laid down by Powell are not feasible, other
[Vol. 54:43
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principles may justifiably replace them. The reasoning is specious.
Nothing obliges or compels universities to take race into account in
admissions. There are in fact excellent reasons for them to avoid
doing so completely. It may be that there are some special
circumstances in which (under Bakke) taking account of the race of
an applicant would not be forbidden. But if those circumstances
cannot be realized in some institutional setting, all that follows is that
race may not be used in that setting.
The above argument makes sense only to those who begin with
the supposition that racial balance is a constitutionally compelling
objective. It is not. The complaint meets a simple answer: if race is to
be weighed at all, it must be weighed only in accord with the
individualized principles Justice Powell laid down. The "right" to use
race in ways inconsistent with the Constitution cannot be defended on
the ground that practical circumstances do not accommodate its
constitutional use.
Objection 4.
Universities give lots of different preferences, often to white
males. Preference is given to athletes, to the children of
alumni, to in-state students, and so on; some of these
advantages are of doubtful wisdom or fairness. Why, if these
preferences are allowed, may preferences by race not be
allowed as well?
Classifying and giving preference by athletic ability, or by alumni
relationships, and the like, is-from a constitutional point of view-
utterly different from classifying and giving preference by race.
Many classifications are used for which rational foundation might be
provided. But race, as a basis for classification and preference, is like
no other. The evil and invidious uses of race in hundreds of years of
American history, and the long constitutional history of racial
classifications, underscores the conclusion, now settled in law, that
race is of all categories the most suspect. Regarding favors given to
athletes, or to the children of alumni, the U.S. Constitution has
nothing to say. But we, to our great sorrow, have learned what deep
and terrible damage the use of racial classifications can inflict. And
so our federal courts now rightly and wisely insist: only under the
very most compelling circumstances may state agencies employ
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racial classifications.63
This argument often has an ad hominem thrust, aiming to
embarrass the critics of preference by showing them to be
inconsistent. But the critics of race preference are not committed to
the defense of any other preference-for athletes, for alumni, or for
any other group. Some of those common preferences may be rational
and defensible, others not. If they are unfair, or unwise, let us reform
or eliminate them. Their retention cannot serve to justify the
unconstitutional and immoral use of racial categories.
Objection 5.
The elimination of race preference in admission will have the
effect of re-segregating the universities, transforming
educational institutions into white enclaves, from which blacks
and other minorities are effectively excluded. This is
intolerable. If we hope to avoid a return to the Jim Crow world
of the early twentieth century, we have no choice but to retain
preference by race.
This argument is sometimes presented to frighten fair-minded
folks who, although opposed to racially preferential devices, detest
the thought of society segregated. Sometimes it is presented to
suggest (on occasion even explicitly to claim) that those who would
eliminate race preferences really are segregationists at heart, closet
racists.
Whether or not intended to besmirch opponents of preferences,
the argument is without merit. Its fundamental premise-that without
race preferences blacks and other minorities will be unable to win
places in undergraduate and in professional schools-is false, and has
been proven false.
At those professional schools in which past race preferences were
very great, as at the Boalt Hall law school at the University of
63. No one has misunderstood this critical point more thoroughly than General Colin
Powell, who wrote: "For those who say preference systems are bad, I would love to take you
through all the preference systems which are acceptable: mortgage deductions, veterans
benefits, colleges eagerly recruiting students who can throw a football or donate a gym. So
we're not against preferences, we're just against any preference that is related to the color of a
person's skin." Colin Powell, USA TODAY, at 7 (Nov. 16, 1997).
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California, the number of admitted minorities must fall when
preferences are ended, of course. Enrollment numbers artificially
inflated by race preferences will then deflate, obviously. But a drop
in those numbers is not "resegregation," nor is it fair to suppose that
minorities are so incompetent as to be unable to gain a substantial
number of places in schools of every sort without racial charity. Fine
applicants and scholars from every ethnic group will continue to
apply to, and to enroll and to teach in educational institutions
nationwide.
That such talk of "resegregation" is no more than a scare is clearly
shown by most recent data on applications and admissions at the two
great universities (the University of Texas and the University of
California) where, as the result of court rulings, referenda, and
regental action, racial preferences are no longer permitted.
Item: Most recent figures from the University of California reveal
that the number of minorities offered admission in many graduate
programs at the University has actually risen or remained essentially
level. 64
Item: After the dissipation of disaffection immediately after the
voters' adoption of Proposition 209, applications to the University of
California have risen substantially. At the undergraduate level, the
number applying to the University of California from every minority
group but one increased markedly in 1997-98: African American
applications by three percent, American Indian applications by nine
percent, Chicano applications by ten percent. 65
Item: In Texas a similar pattern is emerging. At the four medical
schools of the University of Texas system, the number of Hispanic
students offered admission has risen from 108 offered admission in
1997 to 142 offered admission for the fall of 1998. The number of
black students admitted to those medical schools has also risen, from
64. Here is the sum of it:
The new numbers provide the first comprehensive measure of the effect of UC's 1995
decision to stop considering race and gender in admissions.... [Tihe racial balance
among the 7,040 students who enrolled in UC's 600-plus graduate academic
programs-everything from history and literature to engineering and physics-showed
almost no change.
Carol Ness, UC Business Enrollment offin Blacks and Latinos, S.F. EXAM., Jan. 9, 1998, at Al.
65. See Report of the American Civil Rights Institute (Jan. 28, 1998).
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twenty-nine in the previous year to fifty for the fall of 1998.66
Conclusion: It is simply false to assert that eliminating race
preferences will result in the re-segregation of American higher
education. The fear of re-segregation has little basis in fact. And the
premise of the argument based on that fear is shameful, because it
patronizes minority scholars most unfairly, assuming an intellectual
incompetence that is both mistaken and insulting. But the argument is
yet more fundamentally wrong-headed because it presumes that, had
its factual assumptions been true, achieving ethnic proportionality
would justify even deliberate discrimination by skin color. To the
advocates of preference, racial balance is an end so precious that
there is hardly any price not worth paying to promote it.
Objection 6.
The refusal to allow the consideration of race or ethnicity
would turn the admissions process into a mechanical, wholly
quantitative process. But selecting an appropriate entering
class cannot be reduced to numerical algorithms. Critics of
race preference do not comprehend the complexity of the
admissions process; they do not understand that it is as much
an art as a science. They would have us rely entirely upon test
scores and grade point averages, which would result in the loss
of many very desirable students whose scores may not be
distinguished but whose talents are great. Eliminating race
preference would, thus, do great damage both to talented
applicants and to the universities.
This argument is silly; it assumes without warrant that opponents
are simple-minded. But in rejecting race preference critics do not
deny the complexity of the admissions process. That many
considerations beyond the quantitative are properly weighed is well
understood. That admissions should be reduced to a mechanical
sorting of test scores and grades is a foolish claim; no serious critic
would defend or seek that objective. Intellectual attainments are a
very important set of criteria, all agree, and perhaps the most
66. See Texas Sees Turnaround in Medical Admissions, CHRON. HIGHER. EDUC. (Feb. 6,
1998).
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important. But there are other desiderata-talent and character,
acquired skills and work experience, and others-that surely may be
relevant and that on occasion may rightly result in the admission of
some students with academic records less impressive than those of
their competitors. No sensible person denies any of this.
The rejection of race preference is not to be equated with a
reduction of the bases for admissions to the sole criteria of test scores
and grades. On the contrary, once preferences are precluded, there are
no rational considerations that admissions officers would be properly
barred from considering. Precisely which considerations are most
useful in the appraisal of applicants is a matter for professional
admissions officers to determine, acting lawfully. As a matter of
constitutional principle and of morality, however, there are some
principles, those giving preference by race, that must not be generally
employed. Once admissions have been cleansed of these and returned
to race-neutrality, universities are free to conduct their own academic
business, selecting from among all applicants entering classes
appropriate for them.
Whatever considerations universities do choose to weigh,
however, must be weighed without regard to ethnicity. Agents of the
state are not entitled to consider character or talent or experience in
appraising applicants from one ethnic group, while systematically
giving little or no attention to such factors when they are manifest in
other ethnic groups. The remarkable disparities in rates of admission
by race cannot be explained by reference to alleged special virtues of
applicants individually considered, because no race or nationality
exhibits a disproportionate share of human virtue. The consideration
of non-quantitative factors must not be a device with which to
obscure what is in reality a quest for racial balance; in such
consideration, as in all aspects of the admissions process, justice
requires race neutrality.
Objection 7.
Current litigation against university admissions systems
supposes that the white plaintiffs had some right to be admitted
that was denied them by the institution to which they applied.
But they had no such right. Admission to a university, even a
public university, is not a right but a privilege, granted to some
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persons under some circumstances, on grounds that the
university has authority to determine. Rejected applicants
whose academic credentials are superior to many who were
admitted have no justifiable complaint because they never had
a right to admission in the first place. The contention that their
rights were infringed is therefore without merit.
Of course there is no "right" to admission; no sensible person
supposes it. Current litigants understand that fully. They do not claim
that they know that they would have been admitted had there been no
racial preferences given; that is, indeed, very possibly not so. (It is
worth noting, however, that had these rejected litigants been black,
the probability that they would have been admitted is extremely
high.) What rights of these litigants were infringed? They had the
right to be evaluated under a set of rules that are not racially
discriminatory. In a public university they had a right to what they
did not get: a fair, race-neutral evaluation of their credentials.
VI. CONCLUSION
That is the short of the entire matter: Every applicant to a state
university has a right under the U.S. Constitution to the equal
protection of the laws. Where goods are in short supply-as are
admissions to a fine state university-advantages given to some by
race inevitably result in disadvantages imposed upon others by race.
To give by color is to take by color. That is a denial of the equal
protection of the laws which the quest for diversity, as we have seen
at length, cannot justify.
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